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MODERN DEMOCRACY AND RELIGION 
 
Several events that occurred in recent years, in which the 
religious factor was involved, and some perceptions of political 
and social character that were expressed (by some parties, mass 
media, politicians etc) regarding the role of religion, make it nec-
essary, on the one hand, to reconsider the relationship between re-
ligion and modern democracy, and on the other, to highlight some 
key dimensions of democracy, indispensable to its existence. This 
relates to issues arising from wider debates about religion and its 
role in modern society, legislation of different countries which re-
sults from adverse events associated with the religious factor or 
dependent on it, decisions of the European Court of Human 
Rights, concerns that develop as a result of views expressed by 
"scientists" who perceive religious affairs, and religion in general, 
some times emotionally and other times ideologically. This means 
that they do not examine them on a scientific but on a confes-
sional or apologetic basis. In this way, however, they shape wrong, 
non-applicable or non-utilitarian  perceptions about the role of 
religion. 
 
Cultural and Social Data 
 
A key feature that played a vital role in the effective 
change that took place in the modern world is the collapse of the 
socialist regimes in Eastern Europe. This signified the end of an 
ideological and political world that dominated after the Second 
World War, from the mid '40s until the late '80s. With it, came the 
end of the cold war between the then two superpowers, the arma-
ment race, and particularly the division of the world into two so-
ciopolitical systems. This gave rise to the basic question of democ-
racy in many countries which were under undemocratic regimes. 
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At the same time, some fundamental questions were also raised 
about the role of religion in relation to democracy. More specifi-
cally, first, if religion can contribute to the realization of democ-
racy or play a negative role, and second, what the place of religion 
in a democratic society actually is. Some dimensions related to 
these questions were considered either solved or inevitably pushed 
to the margin, at least in Western Europe and Northern America. 
Nevertheless, there are some very important issues related 
to democracy that are perceived differently in Eastern and West-
ern Europe. On those rely religious organizations that seek to ex-
ploit the disruption of "balance" that existed in the postwar period. 
The co-existence of people from the East with those of the West, 
due to recent migrations, actually provides the religious institu-
tions of the Western world with the opportunity to "claim", usually 
indirectly, the restoration to their old position, in terms of author-
ity and power within society. The most specious way of wording 
this claim indirectly is the debate on the position and role of relig-
ion in the public sphere. 
At the same time, some of those involved with the study of 
religion, who promote a veiled theological approach or are simply 
interested in carrying out "missionary" activity for a particular 
religion under the cover of the study of religion or do public rela-
tions with religious institutions, present religion as the driving 
force behind every positive aspect of the specific culture. In this 
way, they expand its presence and role in the world or describe an 
ideal function of religion through idealistic constructions that do 
not correspond to reality. The same applies, to a greater extent, to 
many of those that deal with their religious tradition from a theo-
logical perspective. 
In this context, they do not discuss in essence the issue of 
religious freedom, which is a fundamental individual right of De-
mocracy, but only with the prospect of serving their own religious 
purposes. Moreover, they slander secularism, as they do not con-
sider it as a social phenomenon, but claim it to be a situation im-
posed by the "enemies" of religion. On this issue, several Christians 
and Muslims, who represent religious bodies, seem to agree. In this 
paper, we shall examine if their view is valid. Generally speaking, 
though, religious bodies depend heavily on conspiracy and “perse-
cution” theories. It is easy to promote one's own interests at the 
IOANNIS PETROU 
 
78 
expense of others. They adopt the position of the victim of vari-
ous hypothetical enemies and dark cycles, in order to induce sym-
pathy, or present themselves to others as their savior from situa-
tions that they themselves describe as negative. The outcome in 
these cases is that, in reality, they seek to impose themselves on 
those who were naive enough to believe that they are in risk and 
need a "savior". 
The claims made on the part of immigrants regarding their 
traditions and habits, through which they seek to make those in-
discriminately respected, have in some cases led certain European 
countries to the introduction of regulations. There have also been 
issued relevant European Court of Justice (ECJ) decisions or rec-
ommendations of the Council of Europe on the issue of relations 
between religion and Democracy1, while at the same time an effort 
has been made to bring to the forefront the basic principles of de-
mocracy that have been degraded or forgotten. When there are no 
big problems and society is in a state of prosperity, or even rela-
tive prosperity, the younger generations in particular, who are of-
ten unaware of history, ignore or overlook the importance of rules 
or values and principles that were shaped through struggles and 
sometimes bloody attempts to address problems of political and 
social nature. It should be stressed here that it is not possible to 
have confidence in the intentions and aspirations of religious bod-
ies as they usually act in such a way which does not reveal their 
actual pursuits. 
Along with all these grave problems, they have promoted, 
on the one hand, by the claim put forth by fundamentalist groups2 
in the Arab world to impose religious law, and on the other, by the 
tolerant position adopted by some for political reasons, the view 
                                                             
1 See the following Recommendations of the Council of Europe: 1202 (1993) “Reli-
gious Tolerance in a Democratic Society” 
. 1396 (1999)  “Religion and Democracy”.  
1720 (2005)“Education and Religion”. 1510 (2006) “Freedom of Expression and Re-
spect for Religious Beliefs”. 1804 (2007) “State, Religions, Secularity and Human 
Rights”. 1805 (2007) “Blasphemy, Religious Insults and Hate Speech against Persons 
on grounds of their Religion”.  1962 (2011) “The Religious Dimension of Intercultural 
Dialogue”. CM/Rec (2010)7 “Charter on Education for Democratic Citizenship and 
Human Rights Education”. 
2 See as an example the claims of the "Muslim Brotherhood" in Egypt. 
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that religion can be reconciled with democracy3, so that there 
can be a "religious" democracy. What is more, in the political 
world develop concepts and options of sympathy towards Islam 
that create false impressions. In particular, this is the case with 
some left wing politicians, who, despite the fact that they do not 
know a lot about the role of the religious factor, they have changed 
their negative attitude into the clear aim of accommodating fa-
natical religious groups, thinking that the defense of Muslim reli-
gious pursuits will serve their anti-American aspirations. Fur-
thermore, the notion that when one is simply given the right to 
vote this constitutes a sufficient condition for democracy, func-
tions in a misleading way. 
Such or similar concepts are expressed by supporters of re-
ligion, by groups of populists, but also by those who support the 
expression of democracy through electronic processes. The igno-
rance in these cases and the short-sighted vision of those issues can 
prove to be dangerous for society, democracy and peaceful co-
existence of people. 
To all this must be added the fact that a very negative role 
is played by the articles of journalists and analysts who, thinking 
they know it all, express various "profound views" without actu-
ally delving into the essence of issues about the relationship be-
tween religion and democracy. One should add to those what is 
also happening in the Arab world, and particularly in Egypt over 
the last few months. 
 
Modern democracy : concept and fundamental characteristics 
 
 After all these, the crucial question that comes up is: what 
is modern democracy? What does it comprise of? Is modern de-
mocracy exhausted simply with the right to “elect” and “be 
elected”, ie with the electoral process and participation in it? And 
from there on, one does not need to require anything else? Unfor-
tunately, there are those who delimit "democracy" only to the vot-
ing process and do not see beyond that. Does this mean that, when 
                                                             
3 See the views expressed clearly for political and diplomatic reasons by the U.S. 
diplomacy when speaking of "Islamic democracy", which eventually proved to be 
outright lies. 
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one is elected, then they can impose whatever they wish, for in-
stance a dictatorial or totalitarian, even with religious cover, re-
gime? Is this democracy? Here lies the big mistake, usually pro-
moted by populist parties and movements, as well as sectarian and 
fundamentalist groups, as it directly serves their interests. Of 
course, no one can doubt that the right to elect one’s representa-
tives is a basic condition for democracy, but it is not the only one. 
Instead, it is essential to observe with great precision and care 
some basic characteristics and fundamental principles that define 
democracy and have been configured either for reasons and proce-
dures of the genesis of modern democracy or were formed through 
the passage of time in the context of addressing specific problems 
that had arisen. The fact is that modern democracy came as a re-
sult of the opposition to religiously legitimated political absolut-
ism .  
Due to this fact, modern democracy is pluralistic and based on: 
• popular sovereignty and popular legitimation, 
• the "demystification" of politics or simply the separation 
of politics from religion, 
• the function of secular law for all, as there can be no "re-
ligious" or "divine" law in the context of democracy, 
• the separation of powers, 
• the safeguarding of human rights, which should be per-
ceived not only as rights but also as responsibilities of the 
citizens, 
• the safeguarding of religious freedom, freedom of speech 
and conscience, as well as the free development of human 
personality, 
• the respect for various social and cultural diversities 
• the fundamental principles of the rule of law. 
One of the most critical questions raised on the issue of the re-
lationship between religion and modern democracy is whether re-
ligion contributed to the creation and shaping of democracy. The 
answer is simple. Religion did not function positively in shaping 
democracy neither in antiquity nor in contemporary reality. It is 
necessary to highlight this dimension, because religious institu-
tions argue that religion has contributed positively to the shaping 
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of democracy either within their own internal processes, or, in 
some cases, they seek to support such views outwardly. This hap-
pens because they believe that all good in the world is a religious 
creation, which objectively does not apply. In history, religion has 
played and still plays both a positive and a negative role on sepa-
rate occasions. Moreover, the reference to religion does not auto-
matically mean production of positive work. That depends on how 
the exponents of religion perceive the positive dimension in the 
context of culture and what they choose to do  in particular cases. 
The ultimate, of course, position of religious institutions, which 
has already been mentioned above, is part of their communication 
policies, designed to promote their pursuits. 
There are those who reach such extremes so as to argue that 
their sacred texts actually delineate democracy. It is really "funny" 
even to attempt to overthrow such views, which of course, are not 
based, in any way, on the sacred texts of religions. Besides, the fact 
that religions do not have democratic structures and functions 
constitutes evidence for the opposite. It is quite "funny" to claim 
that one has helped shape democracy within society when their 
own space does not afford democratic structures and functions. 
Contrary to the above unsubstantiated views, it should be men-
tioned here that religion played a negative role in the genesis of 
modern democracy, not a positive one. To understand this view 
one should take into consideration the reasons which led to the 
birth of modern democracy. Modern democracy was born in 
Europe as a response to political absolutism. But absolutism was 
religiously grounded and legitimated; it was theocratic. The myth, 
that is, of totalitarian and autocratic power in Europe until the 
18th century was religious. Moreover, the religious Reformation in 
the 16th century had come to challenge the role of church structure 
and authority. The genesis of modern democracy was combined 
with the abolition of political absolutism, the change in the role of 
the state, the demystification of state power, through the change in 
the method it obtained its legitimacy, and the attribution of this 
role to the people. Following this radical change, the political 
power in the framework of democracy is not legitimated relig-
iously, as was the case in the era of imperial Rome and throughout 
the Middle Ages, but it is legitimated by the people, and is exer-
cised in the name of the people. 
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In addition, an essential role in the shaping of modern social 
world and democracy was played by the turning away from the 
religiously-based static structure of the traditional  world, the un-
derstanding of the possibility of change, the development and re-
construction of the social world, as well as the highlighting of the 
importance and role of human responsibility for the social world 
which is combined with human freedom. 
 
Democracy and religious freedom 
 
         On the basis of what has been mentioned above, religion was 
not the origin of modern democracy, but as a matter of fact it was 
part of the social conditions that caused a strong reaction of man. 
The change in the role of the state is connected with the fact that 
the state is not authoritarian any more, but has transformed into 
an institution that has the responsibility to safeguard the rights of 
citizens. Such rights include as particularly important that of reli-
gious freedom. Therefore: 
• democracy cannot have a religious character,  
• neither can it impose any religious law or specific reli-
gious beliefs,  
• nor can it afford religious legitimation.  
More specifically, religious freedom necessitates the release of 
state from religion. 
 
     This dimension constitutes a very serious parameter, because 
religious institutions pretend not to understand it. They always 
care about safeguarding their own action and presence, but avoid 
understanding what applies to all others as well. And, safeguard-
ing religious freedom can only be realized by a religiously neutral 
state. 
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     The meaning and content of the fundamental right of reli-
gious freedom is clearly expressed in Article 18 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, which reads as follows: "Every per-
son has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. 
This right comprises the freedom to change one's religion or be-
liefs and the freedom to manifest one's religion or religious beliefs, 
alone or together with others, in public or in private, through 
teaching, practice, worship and celebration of religious ceremo-
nies". 
      A similar provision is contained in the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(Article 9 § 1). But in the case of the Convention there is a sup-
plementary provision which specifies the limits for exercising the 
right to religious freedom, which cannot be abusive. More specifi-
cally, it is mentioned that there can be no other restrictions in the 
exercise of the right beyond the measures provided for by law in a 
democratic society in order to safeguard public safety, protection 
of public order, health, ethics  as well as the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others ( Article 9 Paragraph 2).  
      This means that the fundamental right of religious freedom, 
just like any other right, must be exercised in such a manner so as 
not to infringe upon public safety, public order, health or ethics as 
well as the rights and freedoms of citizens. 
       The countries-members of the European Union, recognizing 
the importance of the right to religious freedom along with the 
freedom of thought and conscience, have included a provision in 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Citizen that 
was incorporated in the 2009 Lisbon Treaty. It states that: "Every 
person has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and relig-
ion. This right comprises the freedom to change religion or beliefs 
and freedom to manifest religion or beliefs, either individually or 
collectively, in public or in private, in worship, education, prac-
tice of religious duties and celebrations". 
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State, religion and religious freedom 
 Modern democracy is inconceivable without freedom of 
religion, freedom of conscience and freedom of speech. It is im-
perative that these fundamental human                                           
rights should be thoroughly understood, especially that of religious 
freedom which relates to the topic discussed in the present article. 
Through its analysis and understanding, all the objections raised 
by religious institutions, but also by religious conservatives, can 
be answered. The right of religious freedom means that everyone is 
free to believe what they wish, to change their beliefs, to belong or 
not to belong to any religious group or community, to exercise 
their worship freely, both individually and collectively, to dis-
seminate their ideas. The same applies to religious communities 
and groups. The modern democratic state is obliged to safeguard 
the rights mentioned above. It cannot impose a religion or an ide-
ology of non-religious or antireligious character. What is more, in 
accordance with the general theory of rights4, as well as the Euro-
pean Convention of Human Rights, these rights, either collectively 
or individually, or through the action of institutional religious 
bodies, cannot be exercised abusively. In other words, they cannot 
be exercised in such a way that they violate the rights of others 
who either belong or do not belong to the same collectivity. 
 If one elaborates further on the topic of religious freedom 
several important dimensions come up. First of all, religion cannot 
                                                             
4  About Human Rights see: Brems, Eva, Human Rights: Universality and Di-
versity. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001. Donnelly, Jack, Univer-
sal  Human Rights in Theory and Practice. New York: Cornell University, 
2003. Douglas, Ph., Global Connections: Human Rights. New York: Infobase 
Publ., 2009. Fagan, Andrew, Human Rights. Confronting Myths and Misun-
derstandings. Glos – Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publ., 2009.  Freeman, 
M., Human Rights: An Interdisciplinary Approach. Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2011. Goodale, Mark (ed), Human Rights. An Anthropological Reader. Ox-
ford: Blackwell, 2009. Jowell, Jeffrey – Jonathan Cooper (ed), Understanding 
Human Rights Principles. Oxford – Portland: Hart Publishing, 2001. 
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be a state affair. Therefore, it cannot be associated with "obliga-
toriness", in the sense that people cannot be forced to accept the 
perceptions and authority of a particular religion. That is the rea-
son why perceptions expressed by any religion are freely judged 
and evaluated. Religion in the context of modern democracy is a 
personal or private affair, in the sense that one chooses what they 
do in relation to religion. This does not mean that religion is solely  
an individual affair, because it can be exercised either individually 
or collectively. The characterization "private" relates to the fact 
that it is a matter of free choice of the citizen. So, it is neither "re-
ligion", nor "anti-religion” that can be imposed by the state. In this 
sense, the state must be religiously neutral. Yet the same applies to 
religions and religious institutions as they do not, or should not, 
have the opportunity to use state power to impose themselves on 
citizens. They are "forced" to converse and seek for ways to attract 
those, and thus probably how they maintain relationships with 
them. When they are faced with a big decrease in their member-
ship numbers, especially in Europe, they are then obliged to seek 
for the reason why this happened, thus making self-criticism. 
              Religious institutions cannot gladly accept the positive 
aspects of religious freedom, when they face difficulties with op-
posing teams or non-democratic regimes, but at the same time 
avoid understanding that the way they function or what they re-
quire are neither attractive nor can they be acceptable –in many 
cases- in contemporary reality. For example, both Christian 
churches and Islam promote their own universality through "mis-
sionary activity" or other methods of psychological influence. 
In the context of modern democracy those goals do not 
serve any special purposes. They rather function negatively, be-
cause they correspond to concepts and structures shaped in the 
past, relating to the political and social situation of that time. This 
does not mean that religions/religious institutions did not make, to 
a certain extent, some adjustments to modern culture, regardless of 
the fact that they claim to have remained "unchanged" through the 
centuries. This claim is part of their building a “transcendental” 
identity and authority. Thus, despite the adjustments made, as is 
evidenced by history, they refuse to move on to a real adjustment 
to the present, because they feel this will necessitate a change in 
their structure and perception of power. This difficulty, however, 
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means that many people flee from them, or, more usually, show 
indifference towards them. This is the case mainly in Europe, 
where there used to be powerful religious institutions, and this 
situation led to centrifugal forces on the part of the faithful, 
whereas on the part of the Churches, conservative tendencies, os-
tensibly for self-protection, as well as maintenance of centralized 
structures. In reality, though, conservative preservation of tradi-
tional centralized structures and concepts has a negative effect in 
relation to the safeguarding of relationships with people. This un-
doubtedly leads to the search for indirect ways to secure state pro-
tection of ecclesiastical institutions. But this is something impos-
sible in present time. 
The state is obliged to ensure the rights of citizens against 
anyone who would like to exploit his power at their expense. The 
formation of citizens’ religious identity is a matter of free choice. 
In contrast, the U.S.A., where the situation was different due to the 
demographic composition of the country with immigrants and 
their descendants of different generations, developed the Commu-
nity system and the perception that citizens are free to choose 
whether they belong  to a religious community or not, while the 
state has to ensure their right and support unity on a secular basis. 
The religious communities in this case seek for believers and do 
not promote themselves as strong and firm. 
 Based on what has been mentioned above, particularly re-
garding freedom of religion, religion is, therefore, a personal or 
private affair that can be exercised individually or collectively in 
the public sphere or individually in the private one. Religion is a 
citizens’ personal affair, therefore it relies on free choice. But, all 
collective citizen activities are exercised in the public sphere. Con-
sidering religion to be a private or personal affair is actually the 
opposite of a state affair but this does not mean that it is exercised 
only in the private sphere. There is, much probably, a kind of con-
fusion in understanding some terms, but we would not like to be-
lieve that there has been an intentional misinterpretation of the 
data.  
The truth is that the activities of religious institutions are 
carried out freely in the public sphere, as long as religious freedom 
is guaranteed and there is no violation, on their part, of the basic 
principles that safeguard public order, safety, health, ethics and 
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respect for citizens’ freedom. Let us repeat, at this point, that 
when interpreting the right to religious freedom we should first 
accept that in the context of democratic legitimacy and the rule of 
law, religion is a private affair, in the sense that it is a matter of 
free choice and not imposed or should not be imposed on citizens 
by the state or any other party. Religion can be practiced both in-
dividually and collectively in the public sphere. Therefore, what is 
usually claimed, especially after 1989, by religious institutions, 
particularly in Europe, and cultivated by those who express the 
views of these institutions about religion acquiring a position in 
the public sphere, are views that are trying to break open doors. 
The truth is that  religious institutions, on the basis of the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, the European Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights (1950) and the constitu-
tions of many countries, especially in Europe and North America, 
have the right to act freely in the public sphere. What cannot be 
imposed is their "obligatoriness". This means that, in the frame-
work of modern pluralistic democracy, citizens cannot be forced 
into practicing or not practicing religion or choose a specific 
mandatory religion. Their attitude towards religion is a matter of 
personal choice. On the contrary, the enforcement of "obligatori-
ness" by any religious institution in Europe and America, and 
particularly in the context of modern democracy, would be a viola-
tion of religious freedom. What is more, it goes without saying 
that when there is no guarantee of religious freedom, but certain 
religious beliefs are imposed or the presence of minority religions 
in the public sphere is obstructed, then there is no real democracy. 
On such conditions should modern democracy be discussed at the 
global level. This means that democracy is based on tolerance of 
religious diversity, it cannot be reconciled with the imposition of 
a religion or atheism, nor with the persecution of people on the 
grounds of their religious beliefs. Also, as freedom of religion is a 
characteristic of democracy, its mandatory application is not as-
sociated with mutual claims between states. 
Moreover, regarding religion itself in the frame of plural-
ism, which is guaranteed by democracy and fundamental rights, 
the "authority" of religions is judged  just like any other view. Re-
ligious beliefs and views expressed by religious institutions are 
subject to critical processing and can therefore be accepted or re-
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jected by citizens. This is a valid reason that provides justifica-
tion for the disconnection between state and religion or for the ex-
pression on the part of the state of religious beliefs in the context 
of modern democracy. When for reasons of political expediency 
and international diplomacy this dimension is bypassed or ignored  
the results are deplorable or even destructive. Examples can be 
found in the Islamic world and show that democracy cannot be 
restricted to the electoral process. On the contrary, one must take 
into account the fundamental characteristics mentioned above 
which determine the structure and function of modern pluralistic 
democracy. 
 
 
 
Secularization of society and religious freedom 
 
 Religious institutions and their adherents have been dis-
cussing for long the issue of secularization. They dispute with 
those who support secularization and accuse them of actually im-
posing it. By the term secularization we mean, on the one hand, 
that the state is secular and based on popular sovereignty, and, on 
the other, that religion does not affect society as a sole creator of 
culture, as was the case in traditional society. Secularisation does 
not necessarily entail the absence of religion from society, neither 
its prohibition. The religious institutions, though, argue that there 
are those who wish to impose secularisation. This way of "protest-
ing" that presents religion as "being persecuted" is a communica-
tive means to try and hide their own pursuit to impose religion by 
using state power. In this case, as in many others, the truth lies 
somewhere in the middle, not in the two extremes. Secularisation 
is not imposed by anyone, but as society is pluralistic the safe-
guarding of freedom of religion does not justify any imposition of 
ideological or religious views. Secularisation is a situation that has 
been shaped gradually, especially after the Second World War, and 
is constantly expanding, no matter if religious institutions wish so 
or not. It is right to contend that it is not a global phenomenon. 
But the global situation is more complex than claimed by 
those who promote religion for professional purposes. The root 
cause of secularisation comes from the very religions that cannot 
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adapt to the current circumstances and seek to have the same 
role they used to have in traditional society. They cannot actually 
play an essential role, because they seek to intervene not only in 
ways and with means that are outdated, but also with a sense of 
power that belongs to the traditional past. Furthermore, their 
views cannot be easily accepted by modern man. Therefore, no 
matter what their organic intellectuals claim in their effort to per-
suade people through the use of conspiracy theories, they do not 
manage a lot. Secularisation, however, is combined with religious 
freedom, which means that, particularly in Europe and North 
America and wherever else true religious freedom exists, people 
are free to do whatever they wish regarding religion. 
At this point we should make note of something important. 
There has been use of the argument, particularly in Eastern 
Europe, that religion, until around 1989, was under social ban. 
Nevertheless, this is used by religious institutions both in  Eastern 
and Western Europe as an argument to ask for special treatment. 
Their goal is to achieve any form of legal consolidation so as to be 
able to impose on citizens. The controversy and the ensuing great 
debate that took place on the occasion of the preamble of the 
European Constitution, which finally did not come into force, as 
well as the Article of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European citizen about religion, are indicative of these pursuits5. 
There is, though, a clear differentiation between Eastern 
and Western Europe. While in Eastern Europe religion was under 
social ban during the period of Soviet domination, in Western 
Europe freedom of action was guaranteed within society through-
out this period. Additionally, in Eastern Europe there was no reli-
                                                             
5 About the European Charter of Fundamental Rights see: Peers, Steve – Angela 
Word, The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Politics, Law and Policy. Portland, 
Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2004. Ehlers, Dirk (Ed.), European Fundamental Rights and 
Freedoms. Berlin: DE Gruyter, 2007. Federico, Giacomo Di (Ed.), The EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. From Declaration to Binding Intsrument. Heidelberg- London – 
New York:  Springer, 2011. Παπαδημητρίου, Γ., Ο Χάρτης Θεμελιωδών Δικαιωμά-
των. Σταθμός στη θεσμική ωρίμανση της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης. Αθήνα: Παπαζήσης, 
2001. Τσάτσος, Δ., Ευρωπαϊκή Συμπολιτεία. Για μια ένωση λαών με ισχυρές πατρί-
δες. Αθήνα: Καστανιώτης, 2001. Ι. Πέτρου, «Ο Χάρτης των Θεμελιωδών Δικαιωμά-
των και το ζήτημα των αξιών», στο: Ι. Πέτρου, Πολυπολιτισμικότητα και θρησκευ-
τική ελευθερία. Θεσσαλονίκη: Βάνιας, 2005, σ. 126-137,   
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gious freedom due to the imposed atheist ideology. As it has al-
ready been mentioned above, freedom of religion is not compatible 
with imposing neither a "religion" nor an "anti-religion". In West-
ern Europe, secularisation was the result of a gradual process and 
not a situation imposed by anyone; it occurred within the frame of 
protection of the free exercise of religion, on an individual, collec-
tive and institutional basis. This is the truth. All other claims are 
indirect ways used by religious bodies to stimulate the interest of 
politicians, and, perhaps, citizens. This, however, may work when 
religion is considered useful, and to those who believe that it is 
useful. 
Within the framework of modern pluralistic democracy 
people are free to practice religion in any way and to any degree 
they desire. But the state itself cannot have religious characteris-
tics or function on the basis of religious requirements and data. 
This dimension is difficult to be understood and accepted by reli-
gious bodies and religious conservatives. But the state is obliged, 
in the context of pluralistic democracy, to safeguard the freedom 
of all citizens before the aspirations of any organization or inter-
est group. This issue relates to religions as well. The state must 
safeguard their freedom of action, but at the same time it is 
obliged to remain religiously neutral and ensure citizens' freedom 
before religious institutions. 
 Churches complain because people are moving away from 
them. But still they avoid making any self-criticism. For instance, 
the Catholic Church cannot demand, even in modern times, a par-
ticular role for the Pope and consider that this power structure 
should be discussed and accepted by other Christians as well, con-
sidering that in this way a role is attributed to Christianity in the 
modern world. The mere thought of such a thing sounds funny. But 
there are similar issues that are raised by other Christian Churches 
pertaining to their structure as well as the perception of their 
power and role. Therefore, it is only true that even people who 
maintain good relations with the Churches are either skeptical 
about these concepts and structures or simply reject them and just 
make a selective use of their services. Those, of course, who accept 
the function of these structures and concepts, are those who are 
part of the institutional mechanism of Churches and religions and 
it is understandable why they adopt such a position. The invoca-
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tion of any arguments regarding the human need for religion, is 
again part of their "professional" interests. Although it is consid-
ered "unfamiliar" for religions to accept such terminology, reality 
contradicts their objections. But on the other hand, it is up to a 
citizen to decide what is to one’s personal interest and to what ex-
tent and in what way to make use of the services offered by reli-
gious institutions.  
Religion, social practices and public sphere 
 After all the above, it should be mentioned here that there 
are other serious issues arising in modern democracy and democ-
ratic societies of the developed world either on the part of relig-
ions or based on affairs involving religions. Firstly, the structure 
of Christian Churches and other religions is not democratic, but 
oligarchic, no matter what the religious institutions themselves 
maintain. It can, of course, be argued that it is their right to 
choose what kind of structure they will have. In that case, though, 
they cannot expect to influence the political and public life, nor 
can they label as democratic their apparently oligarchic structure. 
Their influence and involvement in public life will bring changes 
and create problems in democracy. What is more, it is very wrong 
to invoke religious or theological concepts to define political prac-
tices, as those relate to traditional authoritarian structures and are 
contrary to human freedom and political democracy. 
 In recent years, due to migration, there have been raised 
issues related to religions and their role in the public sphere. It has 
been argued that the practices of migrants, which they have 
brought from their countries, are "religious matters" and they 
should be free to practice them in the public sphere. The most 
typical example is the headscarf, and in general the special attire 
of Muslim women that involves covering their entire face. Such 
claims sometimes find support by religious institutions maintain-
ing that those are "religious traditions" and therefore fall within 
the frame of religious freedom. What is obvious, of course, in this 
case, is the selective use of the right to religious freedom. But then, 
the opposite should also be accepted, i.e. the freedom of choice not 
to keep such a tradition. Yet the most important thing in this case 
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is how to understand and characterize these practices. Are they 
religious affairs or traditional practices, and hence social affairs, 
even when they are labelled as religious? 
The headscarf, and generally the covering of the head of 
women, was a practice in all traditional societies in both East and 
West. It is a purely social practice that showed the subordination 
of women to the superiority of men. But as all affairs in tradi-
tional societies denoted a link between the social and religious di-
mension, this also appears to have a “religious” character. The re-
ligious bodies are trying to salvage whatever they can from the 
traditional practices claiming them to be religious. This happens 
because they are trying to salvage their influence on society 
through symbolic actions, clothing habits, and whatever else could 
be seen as "religious"; in this way they make their presence, and 
the “obligatoriness” of religion through traditions deemed as reli-
gious, felt in society, which actually means maintaining their 
power. But it is a mistake to regard all these elements of the dress 
code, in this case the headscarf, as a religious affair. It is a symbol 
of social oppression and subordination of women, and as such it 
does not come under the issues pertaining to the freedom of relig-
ion. But the headscarf is a totally different case compared to the 
issue of prayers and religious ceremonies and celebrations that 
clearly belong to religious affairs. It seems only necessary to dis-
tinguish between the purely religious affairs, practices and sym-
bols that are covered by religious freedom and those that are 
purely social matters and cannot be covered with claims for their 
safeguarding through religious freedom. 
On the other hand, it is not possible to deal with the dress 
code as if it were  a state affair. Of course, no one can interfere in 
the internal affairs of other countries. But one can surely notice 
that such decisions, when they come from the state, make it im-
possible to characterize the specific state as democratic and mod-
ern. Such decisions are incompatible with democracy. The same is 
true when the state allows the use of specific dress codes in public 
services. As those reflect social perceptions of oppression and dis-
crimination against women, the ban, in this case of the headscarf, 
was a positive intervention to remedy such discrimination. On the 
contrary, the lifting of the ban again promotes discrimination, re-
gardless if it is considered meaningful by a part, large or small, of 
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the electorate. Democracy affords some basic principles that 
cannot be reconciled with the promotion of discrimination and 
reproduction of backward practices. For sure, no one can force a 
society into accepting modernization. But in that case, this society 
cannot claim the title of democracy. 
Respect for the other and human rights 
 This topic has been extensively discussed at a global level 
over the last decade. In the context of social and cultural pluralism, 
where a variety of concepts and practices are acceptable in soci-
ety, the idea of respect for the other and otherness has been culti-
vated. Of course, respect is not a unilateral but a reciprocal rela-
tionship. When one asks the other to respect their traditions and 
habits, this does not mean that one can impose them on the other. 
Apart from that, traditions are not infallible truths that do not 
change, but are subject to change as well as influence of the tradi-
tions and beliefs of others. Within the framework of modern plu-
ralistic democracy it is understood that people, indigenous and 
immigrant, have the right to maintain as well as alter various tra-
ditions. Yet, this dimension of respect for the other has some lim-
its that cannot be exceeded. These limits, according to the percep-
tions that have been formulated by UNESCO as a global  funda-
mental principle, have to do with the protection of human rights. 
More specifically, Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights and Bioethics mentions: "One should pay special at-
tention to the importance of cultural diversity and pluralism. 
However, such considerations cannot be used to infringe upon 
human dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms, neither 
against the principles established by this Declaration, nor to de-
limit their pursuit". Thus, the invocation of traditions, whatever 
they may be and whatever nature they may have, socio-cultural or 
religious, cannot justify the violation of fundamental human 
rights. 
 All the above means that one actually helps migrants by 
helping them adapt to the requirements of modern society, and not 
by helping them maintain as big a part as possible of their tradi-
tions. 
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Can religions function positively in the context of democracy? 
 As a final question we should consider whether religions 
can function positively within the context of modern pluralistic 
democracy. If one examines their history through the centuries, 
one understands that it was a story of continuous adaptations. 
They employed a variety of ways to adapt to the social and politi-
cal reality. They have always been "flexible" as their leaders have 
always had aspirations to exercise power or for survival reasons 
when facing difficulties that necessitated adaptation. Taking all 
this into consideration one can see that they can contribute posi-
tively as long as they wish to pursue this direction. But a feature 
of modern politics is the secular dimension. So, towards this direc-
tion, they  should make clear what they wish to say and not seek to 
impose religious "laws" or religious beliefs as ways of function and 
legitimation of the principles and structures of democracy. If this 
is the case, they will not offer positive work but bring back prob-
lems which were overcome with a lot of fights and efforts by mod-
ern man. 
 Modern pluralistic democracy respects and safeguards di-
versity. It allows everyone to preserve their perceptions and tradi-
tions, provided that they do not attempt to impose them on others. 
What is meant by others is not only people outside the family but 
also members, ancestors and descendants, of one’s own family. The 
same applies in cases where religious institutions use particularly 
conservative strata from provincial areas through whom they seek 
to impose traditional perceptions and attitudes that may favor 
them. This means that within democracy religious bodies have to 
respect people's choices. This attitude towards the claims of reli-
gious leadership, an attitude that should not be tolerant towards 
their occasionally irrational claims, may help them adapt to the 
reality of modern democracy: it does not impose anything; it al-
lows everyone to express themselves as they wish. As a matter of 
fact, it is obliged by the Constitution and the universal principles 
to safeguard civil liberties as well as the free development of citi-
zens’ personality. Thus, it cannot, in any way, encourage the aspi-
rations of religious leaders and their structures. 
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As everyone is free to believe as they wish, religions are 
not obstructed. The problem arises from the fact that religions are 
connected with "religious absolute", which in reality proves to be 
"relative", as it comprises elements that vary in time. But this is 
something that religious leaders refuse to admit, as the acceptance 
of this reality will call into question the notion that each one of 
them promotes, i.e. that only they represent the "absolute" truth. 
Ultimately, one may respect their view, but that does not mean 
that one must accept it or even provide them with the means to 
impose it. For this reason they are obliged to accept the basic 
principle shaped in the context of modern pluralistic democracy, 
that every man is free to accept or reject, partly or as a whole, re-
ligious beliefs. Democracy, however, while it safeguards the free 
exercise of religious duties and worship, at the same time it guar-
antees that it will not provide religious institutions with state 
means to impose on society the religious perceptions they repre-
sent. Nor can religion define democracy. Modern pluralistic de-
mocracy is religiously neutral. 
 
In conclusion, one might say that various changes that oc-
curred in modern society over the last two decades, such as the end 
of the global dipolism, the democratization processes of various 
countries, the population movements, the claims of religious bod-
ies for their place in the public sphere, brought up, amongst many 
others, the question about the relationship between religion and 
modern pluralistic democracy. Religion, as it was connected with 
traditional autocracy and its legitimation, was not among the fac-
tors that contributed to the creation of modern pluralistic democ-
racy. The basic elements of modern democracy are its foundation 
on popular sovereignty and fundamental human rights, religious 
freedom and free development of human personality holding a cen-
tral position. These rights cannot be exercised abusively. They are 
exercised as long as they do not infringe upon the rights of others. 
The state must be religiously neutral and safeguard citizens' and 
human rights, religious freedom included. The activity of religions 
in the public sphere is ensured but it cannot be connected with 
“obligatoriness” as citizens are free to make use of religious ser-
vices or not. The same applies to religious perceptions. Respect for 
religions and traditions is delimited to the point that it does not 
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violate human rights. Elements of the dress code, such as the 
headscarf, belong to social traditions and not to religious ones. 
What is more, it is a symbol of social discrimination against 
women that existed and still exists in traditional societies. There-
fore, it cannot be seen through the perspective and guarantee of 
religious freedom. Moreover, it is religion that is obliged to adapt 
to democracy and not vice versa, as there can be no democracy 
based on religious legitimation nor democracy imposing religious 
principles.    
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ΠΕΡΙΛΗΨΗ 
 
Διάφορες αλλαγές που επήλθαν στη σύγχρονη κοινωνία 
κατά την τελευταία εικοσαετία, όπως το τέλος του παγκόσμιου 
διπολισμού, διαδικασίες εκδημοκρατισμού διαφόρων χωρών, με-
τακινήσεις πληθυσμών, αξιώσεις θρησκευτικών φορέων για τη 
θέση τους στο δημόσιο χώρο, έθεσαν μεταξύ πολλών άλλων και 
το ερώτημα της σχέσης της θρησκείας με τη μοντέρνα πλουραλι-
στική δημοκρατία. Η θρησκεία συνδεδεμένη με την παραδοσιακή 
απολυταρχία και τη νομιμοποίησή της δεν ήταν από τους παρά-
γοντες που συνέβαλαν στη δημιουργία της μοντέρνας δημοκρα-
τίας. Βασικά στοιχεία της σύγχρονης δημοκρατίας είναι η θεμε-
λίωσή της στη λαϊκή κυριαρχία και τα θεμελιώδη δικαιώματα, 
στα οποία κεντρική θέση κατέχουν η θρησκευτική ελευθερία και 
η ελεύθερη ανάπτυξη της προσωπικότητας του ανθρώπου. Τα 
δικαιώματα δεν μπορούν να ασκηθούν καταχρηστικά. Ασκού-
νται μέχρις εκεί που δεν θίγονται τα δικαιώματα άλλων. Το κρά-
τος πρέπει να είναι ουδέτερο θρησκευτικά και να διασφαλίζει τα 
δικαιώματα των πολιτών, μεταξύ των οποίων και η θρησκευτική 
ελευθερία. Η δράση των θρησκειών στο δημόσιο χώρο είναι δια-
σφαλισμένη, ενώ δεν μπορεί να συνδεθεί με τη δράση αυτή υπο-
χρεωτικότητα για τους πολίτες, που είναι ελεύθεροι να κάνουν 
χρήση ή όχι των θρησκευτικών υπηρεσιών. Το ίδιο ισχύει και για 
τις θρησκευτικές αντιλήψεις. Ο σεβασμός των θρησκειών και των 
παραδόσεων οριοθετείται μέχρις εκεί που δεν παραβιάζονται τα 
ανθρώπινα δικαιώματα. Ενδυματολογικές συνήθειες, όπως η μα-
ντίλα, ανήκουν στις κοινωνικές παραδόσεις και όχι στις θρη-
σκευτικές. Είναι σύμβολο κοινωνικών διακρίσεων σε βάρος των 
γυναικών που υπήρχαν και υπάρχουν σε όλες τις παραδοσιακές 
κοινωνίες. Γι’ αυτό και δεν μπορεί να αντιμετωπίζεται μέσα από 
την προοπτική και τη διασφάλιση της θρησκευτικής ελευθερίας. 
Ακόμη, η θρησκεία είναι υποχρεωμένη να προσαρμοστεί στα δε-
δομένα της δημοκρατίας και όχι το αντίστροφο. Δεν μπορεί να 
υπάρξει δημοκρατία με θρησκευτική νομιμοποίηση και επιβολή 
θρησκευτικών αρχών μέσω αυτής.   
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